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Retooling the ILO: How a New Enforcement
Wing Can Help the ILO Reach its Goal
Through Regional Free Trade Agreements
THOMAS PAYNE*
ABSTRACT
Raising global labor standards has been a goal of labor activists,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and nations for over a century.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) was created nearly one
hundred years ago for that purpose, but a century later its goal remains
largely unfinished. This paper will propose a retooling initiative for the
ILO that will give it the enforcement power it needs for real labor
standard change and the resources it needs to use that enforcement
power to promote work according to established international labor
standards. This enforcement power will take place through regional free
trade agreements (RFTAs), which have increased greatly in popularity
over the past twenty years. The initiative will take a degree of
voluntarism on behalf of the trade partner countries and their
multinational corporations (MNCs), but it will satisfy goals of all parties
involved, including the MNCs that will pay for the enforcement.
INTRODUCTION
Global labor conditions have been a focus of concern since at least
1919, when the International Labor Organization (ILO) was created to
address poor conditions.' Global labor conditions have grown more
worrisome and more complex with the growth of global trade. As
multinational corporations (MNCs) have grown in both number and
complexity, they have moved production to low-wage countries to lower
* Thomas C. Payne, Managing Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D.
2017 Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. 2014 Purdue
University, thanks to my wife for her endless support and Professor Ken Dau-Schmidt for
his thoughtful comments and suggestions.
1. See About the ILO, IN'L LAB. ORG., http://ilo.org/globallabout-the-ilo/lang--
en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
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their labor costs and gain a comparative advantage over their
competitors. 2 The labor conditions problem in our global marketplace
can be boiled down to the following thought from Debra Maryanov, "The
rapid growth of the global marketplace has outpaced the instruments of
governance, allowing corporations to profit in the interim from
unregulated and cheap labor." 3 Some have argued that this is creating a
race to the bottom for labor conditions, where developing countries try
to attract the business of MNCs by providing the weakest labor
protections and the least amount of regulation and oversight.4 Many
solutions have been proposed and implemented to try to combat that
race to the bottom,5 but it remains a challenge today.
One aspect of the global labor conditions debate is what the best
way to implement higher labor standards is and how to enforce those
conditions. Solutions proposed and used have varied from
extraterritorial application of domestic laws,6 to private ordering and
voluntary standards by corporations,7 to formal international
standards.8 Effective global labor regulation involves three parts: a set
of labor standards to be followed, effective compliance monitoring, and
incentives to avoid noncompliance. 9 Only when all three of these parts
are satisfied can we have truly fair trade on a global scale. Enforcing
international standards should be given even more attention following
2. See Frances Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalizing Labor Markets, 1 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 369, 370-71 (1998); Annette Burkeen, Private Ordering and Institutional
Choice: Defining the Role of Multinational Corporations in Promoting Global Labor
Standards, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STuD. L. REV. 205, 205-06 (2007); Robert Howse, The
World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 131, 132 (1999).
3. Debra Cohen Maryanov, Note, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of Conduct
and the Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 397, 401 (2010).
4. See Bradley Girard, Note, Corporate Transparency Through the SEC as an Antidote
to Substandard Working Conditions in the Global Supply Chain, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 317, 324 (2014); Burkeen, supra note 2, at 210.
5. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 210.
6. See Maryanov, supra note 3, at 416. See generally William B. Gould IV, Labor Law
Beyond U.S. Borders: Does What Happens Outside of America Stay Outside of America?,
21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 401, 401-10 (2010) (discussing the difficulties of applying U.S.
labor law in other countries); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor
Standards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203
(2004) (arguing that U.S. courts should allow the Alien Tort Claims Act to be applied in
other countries).
7. See Maryanov, supra note 3, at 402-11.
8. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 210.
9. See Paul Harpur, New Governance and the Role of Public and Private Monitoring of
Labor Conditions: Sweatshops and China Social Compliance for Textile and Apparel
Industry/CSC9000T, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 49, 49 (2011).
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the election of Donald Trump to President of the United States.
Running on an anti-free-trade platform targeted at the disenfranchised
working class,'0 President Trump's victory tells us that in order for the
working class to buy into free trade, these international standards must
be strictly followed. Without them, the working class will fear global
trade as a cause of their jobs being shipped overseas to where labor is
cheaper due to lower labor conditions.
This paper will analyze the methods being used today to meet these
three parts and improve labor conditions worldwide. In doing so, this
paper will touch on a much-debated solution: a more effective
enforcement arm of the ILO that will help the ILO enforce its own core
standards. However, this paper will argue for that new enforcement
wing to be paid for by MNCs and implemented through the regional free
trade agreements (RFTAs) that those MNCs operate through. This
paper will not argue for a certain public or private method of creating
better labor standards; it will focus only on the enforcement of those
existing labor standards in RFTAs.
I. COMMON SOLUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL LABOR CONDITIONS PROBLEM
The global labor conditions problem is far ranging and complex. The
legal and social science community has debated which conditions are
most important, the best way to enforce them, and who should pay for
them. Much of the literature in this area focuses on two spheres of
alternatives: state-centered or governmental solutions where countries
agree to standards that are enforced with trade sanctions, or private
ordering, where MNCs enforce their own standards through relational
contracting." This dichotomy could also be explained as "hard law" and
"soft law," 12 where hard law comes from state solutions and soft law
comes from the private ordering or relational contracting. Other
solutions include giving NGOs enforcement power to oversee labor
standards. This paper will focus on a mix between state-centered
solutions and private, voluntary solutions involving MNCs and the most
prominent labor rights NGO, the ILO, as enforcer.
10. See Benjamin Oreskes, POLITICO-Harvard Poll: Amid Trump's Rise, GOP Voters
Turn Sharply Away from Free Trade, POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2016, 7:44 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/politico-harvard-poll-free-trade-trump-gop-228600.
11. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 208; Yossi Dahan et al., Shared Responsibility and
the International Labour Organization, 34 MICH. J. INT'L L. 675, 723-24 (2013); Kevin
Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in the
Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARv. INT'L L.J. 203, 205 (2007).
12. See Girard, supra note 4, at 320.
599
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:2
In the state-centered, governmental solution, the producer-factory
country must raise its own standards to a certain level or face penalties
like trade sanctions.1 3 However, this framework has proven difficult to
enforce and is impractical. These producer countries are often the least
developed countries (LDCs) and face their own problems in
implementing and enforcing labor laws. A modern approach to the state-
centered solution can be seen in the rise of RFTAs.
The private-ordering approach has appealed to free trade and labor
supporters alike because MNCs are the driving force behind the race-to-
the-bottom of labor conditions.1 4 The most common MNC approach seen
today is codes of conduct crafted by MNCs seeking to better their brand
appeal.15 The traditional debate between governmental standards and
private ordering has shown that a mix of the two can be useful. 6
But I will argue that the ILO is still in the best position to regulate
the public labor agreements, and it is within the RFTAs that the ILO
should focus its scope of inquiry. Both public and private approaches to
bettering labor standards in LDCs are admirable and have their pros
and cons. But until there exists a centralized and efficient enforcement
mechanism, no labor provision in a RFTA or private code of conduct will
have a lasting impact.
A. The State-Centered Approach: Free Trade Agreement Labor
Provisions
Regional Free Trade Agreements (RFTAs) increased in number and
popularity following the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1995.17 They are seen as an effective tool for countries to
liberalize the trade of goods with various trade-partner countries. The
prototypical RFTA will promote the flow of goods by making certain
rules on things like investment, competition, electronic commerce, and
labor or environmental standards.' 8 A country with a large economy and
consumer base, like the United States, may waive or lower import
tariffs on goods coming from the partner countries in exchange for lower
costs of investment for corporations wanting to put factories in those
13. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 210; Dahan et al., supra note 11, at 696-97.
14. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 210.
15. See Maryanov, supra note 3, at 403.
16. See Kolben, supra note 11, at 205.
17. See Mohammad F.A. Nsour et al., Trends in Free Trade: Legal and Policy
Perspectives on Jordan's Regional Trade Arrangements, 24 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 313,
313-14 (2014).
18. See id. at 315-16.
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countries.19 Thus, RFTAs are attractive to both large importers and
small exporters, and they have become one of the most important
vehicles for global commerce. 20
The inclusion of labor standards in RFTAs came after other
stipulations like investment provisions, but they have grown more
complex and numerous over the last two decades. 21 As Lance Compa
tells us, this application of labor rights to international trade was once
controversial 22 but is now commonplace in many countries' RFTAs. In
the United States, labor provisions have become vital to securing
bipartisan support for a trade agreement. 23 NAFTA, one of the largest
and earliest RFTAs in the world, contained no labor provision but later
added a side agreement that set out the "enforce your own law"24
principle, which has been heavily criticized. 25 That principle simply
holds each trade partner to enforce their own domestic labor laws,
which might vary greatly and, in practicality, offer no additional
protection to workers. 26 Enforcing domestic labor laws also allows
producer-factory countries to change their labor laws to make them
more attractive to MNCs looking for places to build factories.
In 2002, the United States Congress required that the ILO core
labor standards (CLS) be included in any bilateral trade agreement or
RFTA. This led to the next step in labor provisions that is seen in more
recent RFTAs like the one between the United States and Jordan. 27
That provision simply reaffirmed each country's respect of the core
standards of the ILO, and nothing more. The agreement set out a
dispute resolution mechanism for perceived violations, but this dispute
resolution mechanism has been rarely used and does not provide enough
deterrence to violating the standards. Labor provisions that included
19. See id. at 318-19, 338.
20. The WTO predicts that over half of the world's trade takes place within these
agreements. See id. at 313.
21. See id. at 315-16.
22. See generally Lance A. Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty
Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117
(1993) (explaining, in the early 1990s, that labor and trade were becoming inseparable).
23. See Joshua M. Kagan, Note, Making Free Trade Fair: How the WTO Could
Incorporate Labor Rights and Why It Should, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 195, 212-13 n.105
(2012).
24. See Marianne Hogan, Note, DR-CAFTA Prescribes a Poison Pill: Remedying the
Inadequacies of Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement Labor
Provisions, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 511, 522, 528 n.127 (2006).
25. See Kevin Banks, Trade, Labor and International Governance: An Inquiry into the
Potential Effectiveness of the New International Labor Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 45, 53-54 (2011).
26. See id. at 53-55.
27. See Nsour et al., supra note 17, at 338-44.
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both commitments to the ILO standards and "enforce your own law"
statements were the most common types of labor provisions in RFTAs
throughout the past two decades, and they underlie the problem with
the RFTA vehicle for global labor conditions. Not only do countries have
an economic incentive to call for weaker labor provisions, but they also
have a hard time enforcing the provisions.
The enforceability problem stems from the way in which violations
are discovered, which had historically been through complaints. 28 It
used to take a complaint from a worker or other individual to prompt
any type of investigation into the alleged violation of a RFTA labor
provision. This complaint-driven model encourages developing countries
in RFTAs to quiet their workers and discourage complaints, which has a
contrary effect on the ultimate goal to raise their labor standards.
Two other enforcement problems arise, the first being a
jurisdictional problem and the second being a weak penalty problem.
Jurisdictionally, the trade partners have a hard time enforcing their
own laws in other countries. This is particularly a problem in the
United States, which has strong labor laws but is not able to enforce
those labor laws in international jurisdictions on supply-chain
producers. The solution to that problem is to create penalties in the
RFTAs themselves, but these penalties have often been too weak. 29
Until recently, the penalties were nonexistent.3 0 The more common
occurrence is, after a complaint is received, the trade partners will
partake in a dispute settlement mechanism over the alleged violations. 31
What these dispute resolutions lead to is no financial penalties for
producers, but rather a peaceful resolution with a focus on remedial
solutions. 32 While this system may be admirable, it does not further the
goal of labor provisions in RFTAs, which is to improve global labor
standards. Even if the dispute resolution system offered harsh financial
penalties, its infrequent use would continue to make it ineffective.
There have been considerable improvements in labor provisions
within RFTAs, improvements that help make the RFTA framework part
28. See Banks, supra note 25, at 53.
29. See Hogan, supra note 24, at 530-31.
30. For example, in the NAALC, the labor provision governing NAFTA, actual fines
were only available in limited circumstances, and the trade partners were allowed to
amend their laws to get around these fines. Id. at 522-23.
31. See TPP: Made in America, Chapter 28: Dispute Settlement, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, httpsJ/ustr.gov/sites/defaultfiesf
PP-Chapter-Summary-Dispute-Settlementpdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) [hereinafter TPP
Dispute Settlement].
32. Often these remedial solutions may include monetary fines, but those fines go back
to the offending country in order to help fund remedial programs, thus resulting in no real
financial penalty. See Hogan, supra note 24, at 526.
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of my ultimate proposed initiative. Starting with the U.S.-Korea RFTA,
provisions have been included that prohibit trade partners from
weakening their own labor laws during the life of the agreement and
also prohibit them from arguing that a "lack of resources" keeps them
from policing their own standards.3 3 The Korean RFTA, along with
RFTAs with Columbia, Panama, and Peru, all still used the dispute
resolution process, but they did remove caps of $15 million on fines that
had existed before them.34
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a RFTA between the United
States and over a dozen Pacific countries, contained perhaps the most
stringent labor provision to date, but with the recent election of Donald
Trump to the Presidency of the United States, the TPP appears dead in
the waterA and is highly unlikely to be passed by the U.S. Congress. 36
The labor provision in the agreement set out financial penalties that
essentially reinstated import tariffs for countries that violated
provisions of the agreement.37 The TPP included the usual commitment
to abiding by the fundamental labor rights set forth by the ILO's CLS.3
Also included in the TPP labor provision was a consultative mechanism
designed to help address labor concerns when they arise, and perhaps
most significantly, the agreement included a way for the public to raise
concerns directly with TPP trade partners if they thought a trade
partner violated the labor provision. 39 This added feature could help
with the problem in past RFTAs of reliance on complaints from
exploited workers. Finally, a commitment to have laws regarding hours
of work, minimum wages, and health and safety was included and
"backed up" by trade sanctions.40
It remains to be seen what will happen with future trade deals
given the policy change that Donald Trump's election will bring. What is
33. Nicole Skibola, The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement: The Evolution of Fair Trade
Through the Free Trade System, 10 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 183, 189-90 (2010).
34. See id. at 188-89.
35. See Alan Yuhas, Congress Will Abandon Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal, White
House Concedes, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2016, 8:14 PM), httpsJ/www.theguardian.mm/busin
ess/201/nov/12tpp-trade-deal-congress-obama.
36. The TPP had originally drawn heavy criticism from U.S. labor organizations
because of the inclusion of trade partners like Vietnam, who currently do not allow
workers to independently unionize. See Labor Rights, AFL-CIO, http//www.aflcio.orgfissues/
Tradefl'rans-Pacific-Partnership-Free-Trade-Agreement-TPP/Labor-Rights (last visited Feb. 27,
2017).
37. See TPP: Made in America, Chapter 19: Labor, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Chapter-Summary-Labour-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) [hereinafter TPP Labor].
38. See id.
39. See TPP Dispute Settlement, supra note 31.
40. See TPP Labor, supra note 37.
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known is that Congress will not pass the TPP and the new
Administration will likely take a very different tone on future trade
deals. Donald Trump's opposition to free trade deals revolved around
their economic impact on American jobs and workers, and not with the
labor provisions included within the deals. Moving forward, it will be
important to monitor how his administration handles free trade and the
labor provisions contained within the agreements.
A large body of literature exists analyzing the effectiveness and
importance of RFTAs on labor rights. Although RFTAs are far from
perfect, 41 my contention is that they can serve as a viable framework for
what the ILO's new enforcement wing will monitor and enforce.
B. The Private Ordering Approach: Corporate Codes of Conduct
Multinational Corporations' codes of conduct are essentially an
application of private ordering, or private lawmaking, to the labor
conditions arena. Private ordering can be an effective alternative to
government regulation, 42 which is needed in the RFTAs. However, these
codes have proven difficult to enforce because they are ripe with
conflicts of interest and compliance problems. These problems can be
summed up as one critic put it "the company that seeks to pursue profit
and do 'good works' at the same time is likely to do neither very well." 43
Corporate codes of conduct have become increasingly popular over
the last two decades, as the anti-sweatshop movement has forced MNCs
to address the conditions of their supply-chain workers in LDCs.44
Pressures from documentaries and expos6s covering workplace abuses
like child labor have made investors, board members, and shareholders
all call for some type of internal change. 45 By 1995, MNCs like Wal-
Mart, Sears, Levi Strauss, and Starbucks had all created some type of
corporate code of conduct for their overseas subsidiaries. 46 These codes
41. For example, many of the past RFTAs done by the United States have shown in
practice to rely on the trading partner to domestically deal with its own violations. See
Skibola, supra note 33, at 190-91.
42. See generally Burkeen, supra note 2 (examining how private ordering among
multinational corporations and suppliers can eliminate sweatshop conditions in less
developed countries).
43. Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchlffe-Darricarrbre, Enforcing International Labor
Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 665 (1995).
44. Atle Midttun, Partnered Governance: Aligning Corporate Responsibility and Public
Policy in the Global Economy, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 406, 407-08 (2008).
45. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrbre, supra note 43, at 674-75.
46. See id. at 686. This movement is not confined to MINCs based in the United States.
For example, Petrobas, a Brazilian energy company worth over 20 billion U.S. dollars, has
invested 200 million dollars per year into this type of "Corporate Social Responsibility."
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were seen as an effective self-regulation tool in a global market that had
no effective way to enforce labor conditions. 47 Although the ILO
promulgated its own core labor standards in 1998, it currently lacks
enforcement power, as does the World Trade Organization in the area of
labor. Therefore, company codes of conduct, even if weak, were seen as a
step in the right direction.48 They fit the global trade model of efficiency
and they grew from mere mission statements to actual contracts with
the companies' supply-chain producers. Codes of conduct are flexible to
market demands and changes and can be routinely reviewed and
changed to fit with the current standard for labor protections in
developing countries."
To understand the underlying problem with codes of conduct, it is
important to understand that they are used by MNCs to further their
business interests, specifically to strengthen their brand image.50 As
Lance Compa explains it, there lies behind these codes "a more
immediate self-interested motive" than "altruism."5 1 MNCs are still
attempting to achieve the greatest profit on their goods, which means
the lowest labor costs, but they are now forced to balance that with
maintaining a good brand image which is negatively affected by being
seen as employing sweatshop-type workers.
Codes of conduct are self-regulating, meaning the MNC itself is in
charge of monitoring and penalizing supply-chain producers that break
their respective codes. 52 This creates a large conflict of interest for the
corporation who does not want to penalize its low-cost producer and
does not want the public to know about the producer's transgressions,
creating concern over "the fox guarding the henhouse."5 3 What this
leads to is weak enforcement 54 and public relations campaigns that aim
to cover up large violations of labor conditions set out in the company's
code of conduct.
An example of the weakness of codes of conduct is the controversy
surrounding the California Supreme Court Case, Kasky v. Nike, where a
labor activist sued Nike over misleading speech when it was discovered
that a factory it used in Vietnam was employing workers in heinous
Dana C. Nicholas, Note, China's Labor Enforcement Crisis: International Intervention and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 11 SCHOLAR 155, 181-82 (2009).
47. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrbre, supra note 43, at 687; Maryanov, supra note
3, at 403-05.
48. See Maryanov, supra note 3, at 402-03.
49. See id. at 406-09.
50. See id. at 403.
51. Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrbre, supra note 43, at 669.
52. See Maryanov, supra note 3, at 409-10.
53. See id. at 409.
54. See id. at 411-12.
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conditions.5 5 The workers were forced to work hours exceeding even
Vietnamese labor law limits, and the air they worked in was found to
contain carcinogens that were causing a large number of respiratory
diseases. The lawsuit came out of a Nike statement that said, based on
an internal audit, its workers were working under "superior" conditions
and earned "superior" wages.56 The case, which ultimately went against
Nike, showed the limits of MNCs' codes of conduct and perhaps more
importantly, showed the lengths that MNCs would go to protect their
brand image from the realities of their supply-chain workers' working
conditions.
A second problem with codes of conduct is the fact that they do not
require MNCs to disclose the level of compliance with their own codes.5 7
Because the codes of conduct are completely voluntary, the companies
decide which information from their internal audits is released and
which information is not released. Much of this comes from the fact that
the companies choose who monitors their compliance with their own
rules. Many third-party NGOs and private companies outside of the ILO
exist to offer inspection and monitoring services for companies that are
operating under their own codes of conduct. Although these inspectors
are supposed to be independent, they are hired by the corporation and
are not believed to be the most independent option. More on these third-
party monitors will be covered in Section III.B. As long as the MNC
itself is in charge of hiring and overseeing who does the monitoring and
compliance, the results that are produced from that type of system
cannot be trusted.
A final problem with codes of conduct and private ordering is that
companies eager to improve their brand image may have over-
exaggerated the effectiveness of their codes. Although a market-driven
solution seems admirable, at least one scholar has argued that it has
created an unbalanced distribution of resources, where higher-skilled
workers benefit much more than lower-skilled workers.58 Because the
improvement of global labor standards is predominately focused on
lower-skilled workers, this distribution of resources is not seen as a
positive result. Although private ordering via MNCs' codes of conduct
are an appealing, market-based solution to a global problem, they have
proven weak at best. Monitoring programs implemented by a company
operating under its own corporate codes of conduct are set up for failure
55. See Julia Fisher, Note, Free Speech to Have Sweatshops? How Kasky v. Nike Might
Provide a Useful Tool to Improve Sweatshop Conditions, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 267,
267-70 (2006).
56. Id. at 268.
57. See Girard, supra note 4, at 318.
58. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 223-24.
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due to the possibility for conflicts of interest. A more independent
enforcer of working conditions is needed to avoid the conflict of interest
inherent in self-regulation, and that independent enforcer is bound to be
more successful.59
This paper's proposed initiative will make corporate codes of conduct
unnecessary. Their importance to my proposed initiative is in their
motivation: for MNCs to improve their brand image by improving labor
conditions within their supply-chain. Through my proposed new ILO
enforcement wing, those MNCs will be encouraged to put their money
where their mouth is by funding a more credible monitor and enforcer
who has the capability of improving labor conditions within those
supply chains.
II. THE ILO IS THE PREEMINENT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOCUSED
ON GLOBAL LABOR CONDITIONS, BUT IT HAS LONG HAD AN ENFORCEMENT
PROBLEM
A. The Purpose of the ILO Continues to Be to Raise Global Labor
Standards
The ILO was established early in the twentieth century by the
League of Nations with the goal of improving labor conditions
worldwide.60 Over the past hundred years, the ILO has focused on its
primary goal, "to promote the global community's acceptance of
international labor standards through the adoption of conventions,
guidelines, and recommendations after consultation with governments,
labor unions, and employers." 6 1 The ILO has grown to be the third
largest United Nations agency, 62 and has done a very important job in
defining international labor standards and attempting to have countries
around the world adopt them. But mostly because of an enforcement
issue, they have fallen short of establishing binding international labor
standards.
59. See Marc J. Monte, Note, Corporate Factory/Supplier Monitoring Programs and
the Failure of International Law in Regulating Indian Factory Conditions, 26 BROOK. J.
INT'LL. 1125, 1128 (2001).
60. See Edward E. Potter, The Growing Significance of International Labor Standards
on the Global Economy, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 243, 243 (2005).
61. Developments in the Law: Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2205 (2005).
62. See Potter, supra note 60, at 244.
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B. The ILO Has Weak Enforcement Powers but a Strong Monitoring
System
The ILO does not have enforcement powers.63 Unlike the UN, which
has the power to enforce its promulgations, the ILO has no power to use
armed forces or economic sanctions against countries violating labor
standards. 64 This lack of enforcement power, along with the problem of
jurisdiction,65 has kept the ILO from making binding international labor
standards.6 6 Instead of comprehensive standards, the ILO issues its
conventions and guidelines and calls on member countries to ratify
them.67 Only when ratified by a country do they become legally binding
and subjected to the ILO's monitoring.68 Because the ILO's conventions
on labor rights are voluntary, they serve merely as promotional
standards, especially to the large number of member nations that
choose not to ratify.6 9
Despite its inability to enforce its conventions on every member-
state, the ILO has developed an extensive monitoring system that
monitors the application of its conventions in states that have ratified
them. 70 Again, being subjected to ILO monitoring is voluntary, only
those states that have ratified the conventions are monitored on those
respective conventions.7 ' The monitoring system includes a reporting
63. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 233-34; Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrbre, supra
note 43, at 671.
64. See Virginia A. Leary, The Paradox of Workers'Rights as Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22, 41 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F.
Diamond eds., 1996); Monte, supra note 59, at 1135-36. The original ILO Constitution did,
in fact, give member nations economic sanction power over other members, but this power
was removed following WWII. See Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in
International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV.
649, 652, 690-94 (2006).
65. Article 2 of the UN Charter specifically states that matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of member states do not fall within the enforcement of the UN or any of its
agencies. See Monte, supra note 59, at 1127.
66. The goal of implementing international labor standards has also failed because
some critics see them as poorly disguised, western standards that are being imposed on
developing countries with weak economies in order to paternally protect their own
economies. See Karen Vossler Champion, Comment, Who Pays for Free Trade? The
Dilemma of Free Trade and International Labor Standards, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 181, 215-16 (1996).
67. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261, 262 (2005).
68. See Helfer, supra note 64, at 653.
69. See Philip Alston, 'Core Labour Standards' and the Transformation of the
International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 457, 506-08 (2004).
70. See Leary, supra note 64, at 41.
71. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 237.
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system that allows the ILO to investigate state reports, interview state
officials, and make visits to the member-state to inspect its application
of the ILO labor rights conventions. 72 When a member-state is found to
have violated the convention that it ratified, the ILO taps into its
toothless disciplinary power consisting of a 'mobilization of shame'
through publication of [the nation's] failure[s]."73
Although this type of public shaming could be effective, it is not
strong enough to effectuate real change. Another problem with the
ILO's current power is that many countries simply choose not to ratify
conventions. Even the United States, which has some of the strongest
labor protections in the world, has only ratified two of the ILO's eight
fundamental conventions. 74 Although the United States was at the
forefront of a failed 1990s movement to give the ILO stronger
enforcement power, it has still failed to ratify a significant number of
those conventions.75 Ratification of the eight ILO fundamental
conventions varies widely. Some conventions have been ratified by up to
164 countries, while others have been ratified by only two member
nations.76 In the mid-1990s, the ILO adopted a new strategy and
reduced the main eight labor rights conventions to a summarized list of
four "Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,"7 7 or core labor
standards (CLS). The four core labor standards are:
1. Freedom of association and the effective recognition of
the right to collective bargaining;
2. The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labor;
3. The effective abolition of child labor; and
4. The elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation.78
72. See id.
73. Leary, supra note 64, at 41. See Burkeen, supra note 2, at 237.
74. See Potter, supra note 60, at 243.
75. See Alston, supra note 69, at 466-47.
76. However, no convention has been ratified by all member-states, and no member-
state has ratified all of the conventions. See Developments in the Law: Jobs and Borders,
supra note 61, at 2205-06.
77. See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 67, at 262-63.
78. Howse, supra note 2, at 133 n.5; Developments in the Law: Jobs and Borders, supra
note 61, at 2206.
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The standards were widely ratified, but they were merely
"promotional" in nature, which is what many of the member nations
wanted.7 9 "[P]romotional" means that the member nations "promise to
seek to achieve the goals and objectives, but not the legal requirements,
of the fundamental ILO conventions."80 Besides not wanting to open
themselves up to sanctions from an international body, ILO member
nations had another reason to support only promotional standards: they
had already begun to fully buy into the idea of voluntary labor
standards, often through the codes of conduct of MNCs discussed
earlier.8 1
At the time the CLS were drafted by the ILO, a debate raged over
whether labor rights should be linked with the complex issue of global
trade. 82 The debate came as more countries began including labor
provisions in their RFTAs, which explicitly linked the two together. The
United States has long been a proponent of linking the two hand-in-
hand, 83 and even proposed that the WTO be given enforcement power,
via trade sanctions, over countries who violated labor rights." This
push, however, has been rejected by the WTO, who has claimed that the
ILO is the better international organization to handle labor rights
issues.85
On that front, this paper agrees with the WTO. Although toothless
at the moment, the ILO does have the institutional structure to take on
a greater role in enforcing labor standards around the world. If
countries were more willing to submit to the enforcement of the ILO, the
ILO could become a more powerful organization capable of improving
global labor conditions. And given the rise of RFTAs and the continual
linkage of trade and labor rights, the best medium for the ILO to
operate within would be the RFTAs of countries who voluntarily submit
to the ILO's enforcement and monitoring.
79. See Alston, supra note 69, at 506-08.
80. Potter, supra note 60, at 249.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 244; Champion, supra note 66, at 182; Howse, supra note 2, at 132-33;
Kolben, supra note 11, at 203-04.
83. See Potter, supra note 60, at 248.
84. See Alston, supra note 69, at 466-67.
85. See Developments in the Law: Jobs and Borders, supra note 61, at 2208; Maryanov,
supra note 3, at 403. A growing body of literature has also called for the WTO to take on
more responsibility in enforcing labor standards across the globe. See, e.g., Kagan, supra
note 23, at 224 ("If the world community is serious about promoting an agenda centered
on fair . .. then integrating labor rights into the WTO provides the opportunity to do just
that.").
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III. THE ILO AS THE BEST ENFORCER
A. The ILO's Goal and Already Established Infrastructure Make it the
Best Organization to Carry Out the Enforcing and Monitoring of Labor
Standard Compliance Worldwide.
The ILO, as an independent organization focused on global labor
conditions and with an already established infrastructure, would be the
best body to enforce the labor provisions within the RFTAs of the trade
partners submitting to the ILO's enforcement. In the debate between
linking trade and labor rights, one key question is who should be in
charge of the standards and enforcement. As discussed earlier, the WTO
has rejected the premise that it should be responsible.86 The reasoning
for making the WTO responsible is it already has trade sanction power,
but transferring labor relations enforcement to that organization seems
unlikely. The ILO has a tripartite organizational structure where
members of each government, members of labor organizations, and
members of member-state's employers all take part.87 With this type of
well-rounded participation from so many important groups, the ILO is
best suited to take on the challenge. Many scholars agree on this
point,88 although these scholars differ on what the exact role of the ILO
should be.
B. Other Possible Enforcers and Monitors Are Inferior to the ILO
Some labor activists want labor provisions to be stricken from the
RFTAs that have become so popular today. They would rather the two
be completely separate, with RFTAs being a trade issue and labor rights
provisions being a separate issue, under the umbrella of the ILO.
Although a widely different proposition than mine, it has the same
premise as the ILO being the best organization to handle the matter.
Another solution floated around by scholars, along with the WTO as
enforcer, is to handle violations of labor standards through the UN's
International Court of Justice (ICJ). 89The ICJ is the main judicial body
of the United Nations. As a court, the decisions that come from it are
binding on those nations involved. The main problem being that a
country must voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction.9 0 Thus we have a
86. See Kagan, supra note 23, at 199.
87. See Helfer, supra note 64, at 651; Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 67, at 262.
88. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 60, at 243.
89. See Nicholas, supra note 46, at 159-60, 176-77.
90. See id. at 177 n.104.
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similar problem with the ICJ as we have with the ILO, influencing
countries to agree to be bound by its decisions.
In addition, other NGOs have been created throughout the world
specifically to handle labor issues. Some of these NGOs include the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the
Fair Labor Association (FLA), and the World Bank. While these NGOs
may be viable options for labor standard enforcement, they have proven
to not go far enough in protecting labor standards.9 ' For example, in a
comprehensive survey of common monitoring organizations around the
world undertaken by Lance Compa, he found that one problem with
organizations like the FLA was that they focus on company- and plant-
specific violations and inspections, instead of country-wide violations. 92
Although repeat violations could signal a problem with the producer-
factory country itself, this data was difficult to compile.93
As discussed in section I.B. on codes of conduct, MNCs hire these
types of third-party monitors to determine their supply-chain producers'
level of compliance with their codes. Besides the disclosure issue already
discussed, a more critical problem exists with these third-party
monitors. Private, third-party monitoring has expanded greatly in the
last decade, but it still remains "a largely un-professionalized and non-
standardized industry."94 One of the reasons for this lack of
standardization is the monitoring inspectors' lack of training. One
example of this is the over-worked inspector who had to learn the
various company codes of conduct along with the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations while traveling to the
factory he was to inspect. That inspector claimed to have inspected
twenty-three factories without any training.9 5
This type of haphazard and unstandardized monitoring undermines
the enforceability of labor standards. Instead of wasting their time,
effort, and, most importantly, money in employing these third parties,
MNCs should help fund a reinforced enforcement wing of the ILO to
monitor the provisions set out in the RFTAs that they operate under.
With the advanced monitoring and reporting system already in place,
91. See Maryanov, supra note 3, at 410-11.
92. See Lance Compa, Assessing Assessments: A Survey of Efforts to Measure Countries'
Compliance with Freedom of Association Standards, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 283, 301
(2003).
93. See id. at 302.
94. Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, Note, Increasing Quality and Accountability in Global
Labor Monitoring, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 289, 300 (2014).
95. Id. at 302. For more on third party auditors, see Michael Blanding, How Big
Brands Should Monitor Factory Conditions in Their Supply Chains, FORBES (Sep. 12,
2016, 10:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2016/09/12/how-big-
brands-shouid-monitor-factory-conditions-in-their-supply-chains/#3b9eld2c2912.
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the ILO has the capability of effectively reaching all nations submitting
to its oversight. As an independent body, the conflict of interest
concerns that come with company codes of conduct or even the
"independent" monitoring agencies9 6 would not be present, and
therefore the ILO's enforcement wing would be more respected. With
that established infrastructure, the expansion of their enforcement that
I am proposing would be smoother than if it were given to another NGO
or third party.
IV. MNCs ROLE IN FUNDING THE ENFORCEMENT WING AND THE RFTAs
AS THE FRAMEWORK FOR INSPECTION
The MNCs of the trade-partner countries should pay for the
expanded ILO enforcement wing because they are the main
beneficiaries of the RFTAs and it will further their goal of corporate
responsibility. Viewed as a tax, many if not all MNCs would balk at this
proposal, but there is reason to have hope. These MNCs are already
heavily invested in promoting their public image via their corporate
codes of conduct. Current costs in creating and maintaining a code of
conduct are substantial. They include the costs of altering a company-
wide policy, training personnel on the new policy, and paying for
internal and external auditors.97 They also include increased costs in
things like higher wages and changes to working conditions that arise
from the audits.98 An investment in an improved ILO enforcement wing
would show a more serious commitment to global labor conditions on
behalf of MNCs. MNCs have been attempting, even if half-heartedly, to
raise labor conditions throughout their supply chains for years through
their codes of conduct. Enforcement through the ILO would remove the
need for and costs of their own codes of conduct and would create a more
reliable enforcement and monitoring system free from conflict of
interest or poor training problems.
The ILO's monitoring and enforcement would involve two sets of
inquiries. First, they would monitor for compliance the labor provisions
contained in the RFTAs. Many of these simply call for "enforce your own
law" or "respect the core labor standards," but this first line of inquiry is
practical and very important. Confining the ILO's expanded power to
the RFTAs will keep it a voluntary effort. In an effort for the ILO to only
bite off what it can chew, it should focus on what is contained in the
96. See Monte, supra note 59, at 1128.
97. See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 402 (2005).
98. See id.
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RFTAs that the trade partners agreed to and have now agreed to have
enforced by the ILO.
Using the RFTA labor provisions as the first line of compliance and
enforcement should have an upward impact on global labor conditions
because labor provisions, at least in the United States' RFTAs, have
been increasingly stringent as time progresses. As mentioned earlier,
the now defunct TPP agreement between the United States and a host
of Pacific Rim nations did have the most stringent labor provisions of
any RFTA.
In addition, the ILO would monitor and enforce compliance with its
four core labor standards. Many of the codes of conduct promulgated by
MNCs involve things like respecting the CLS or other ILO conventions,
so making these the second line of inquiry for monitoring should not be
controversial for the trade partners or their MNCs. In effect, the partner
countries and their MNCs would not be subjected to any greater labor
standards or more difficult compliance issues; they would simply have
their current standards inspected by a more credible organization than
the often colnflicted inspectors they currently use.
This type of enforcement wing will require buy-in from two main
players: the trade-partner countries and those countries' MNCs. For the
trade partners, this is a no-brainer. They no longer have to subsidize the
cost of monitoring their trade partner countries, and they can rely on
the ILO to hold both accountable. The ILO would only enforce and
penalize according to the RFTA, so the trade partners have complete
control over their fate, not to mention they must willingly submit to the
ILO enforcement. Buy-in from the MNCs would be harder, as previously
mentioned. Much of the practicality of this proposal would revolve
around the cost. If the cost remained modest, MNCs with large funds
might see this in a positive light. As mentioned in an earlier footnote,
Petrobas, a large energy company in Brazil, spends $200 million per
year in corporate social responsibility9 In theory, they would no longer
need their own program and could rely on the ILO to enforce itself.
Therefore, for Petrobas, as long as the cost was under the gargantuan
number of $200 million per year, the ILO enforcement initiative would
be a worthwhile investment.
It is important to note that not all trade exists within the
framework of RFTAs, but this is precisely why the initiative could work.
It is estimated that around half of the world's trade happens within the
framework of RFTAs,100 and that number is even higher in the United
99. See Nicholas, supra note 46, at 181-82.
100. Nsour et al., supra note 17, at 313.
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States.101 If the ILO was expected to monitor all labor provisions
throughout the world, it would be unlikely for it to be able to handle the
large volume. Monitoring within the framework of the RFTAs gives the
ILO a more manageable caseload with which to begin the initiative.
As already touched on, Donald Trump's recent ascent to power in
the United States might seem to throw a wrench into this plan given his
anti-free-trade stance. 102 However, I believe this proposal aligns nicely
with some of the views he vocalized during his campaign. President
Trump has heavily criticized fair trade deals like NAFTA and the TPP
as not being well-negotiated deals. His opposition to fair trade seems to
be that the deals are not good enough for American workers. From this
standpoint, free trade deals negotiated by his administration could
include even stricter labor standards, which would help American
workers by furthering one of Donald Trump's biggest stated goals:
keeping jobs in America.10 3 Thus, this plan could decrease the incentive
for American companies like Carrier to transport jobs overseas and
could work well with the Trump Administration's stated goals.
CONCLUSION
The problem of improving and enforcing global labor standards is
one that is not going away anytime soon. As the world continues to
blend through globalization, trade between MNCs will only increase,
creating further labor problems all over the world. The ILO, in its
preeminence as a labor organization, still remains the best body to
institute change in global labor conditions. Despite the growing trend of
private ordered solutions and RFTA labor provisions, an independent,
established, and knowledgeable organization like the ILO is the best
hope we have at making a real improvement in global labor conditions.
The MNC-funded enforcement wing would give the ILO the tools it
needs to expand its reach, while trade partners will have an
independent enforcer of their self-created RFTA labor provisions. The
outlier, the MNCs, should consent due to the fact that their goal of
corporate social responsibility, which has recently taken the form of
101. However, there is some speculation that a larger-than-thought percentage of US
trade is being handled through "temporary tariff waivers," which allow companies and
industries to avoid the stipulations set out in the trade agreements. Edward Gresser,
Labor and Environment in Trade Since NAFTA: Activists Have Achieved Less, and More,
Than They Realize, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 491, 498 (2010).
102. See Oreskes, supra note 10.
103. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Trump to Announce Carrier Plant Will Keep Jobs in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), http/www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/business/trump-to-announce-
carrier-plant-will-keep-jobs-in-us.html?_r=0.
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corporate codes of conduct, will be more effectively met by an
independent monitor and enforcer like the ILO. This proposal could
align well with the recent political changes across the globe, where
middle-class workers have grown increasingly uneasy about global
trade, which they perceive as a threat to their own livelihood. My
proposal could reduce the incentives that MNCs face to move jobs to
LDCs and keep jobs in countries like the United States. Although the
cost would be crucial to the success of the initiative, this type of
bolstered-ILO oversight should be a focus of inquiry for labor activists,
scholars, and governments alike.
